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ABSTRACT
Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition
with each other for profitable international markets. In such a
world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from
a national point of view, because they improve the relative position
of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms,
enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In
effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms
play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its
welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds
the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibrium
is characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even
though they are jointly suboptimal.
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1. Introduction
Considerable recent attention has been focussed on the role of export
subsidies in international trade policy. Effective subsidization of firms
engaged in international rivalry has been a common practice in western
economies for some time, and there seems to be a growing belief that
foreign subsidization of exports is "unfair" and merits some sort of retali-
ation.
Such policies do not appear to make much sense from the standpoint of two-good
competitive models of international trade. Even in markets where the
domestic country can exercise some influence over world prices, the
domestic interest is served by trade restriction, not by subsidization of
trade.1 If foreigners wish to subsidize us to consume the goods they produce,
so much the better for us.
How then are we to understand arguments in favor of export subsidization
and in favor of retaliation against foreign subsidization. Rather obviously,
domestic producerswho stand to gain from protection or subsidization would
be strong proponents of such arguments.:Still, the alleged success of
Japanese policies, for example, suggests that there may be more to the
issue than just this.
In this paper we present an analysis based on imperfect competition to
explain why export subsidies might be attractive policies from a domestic point
of view. Tile central idea is that it is to the advantage of a country to
capture a large share of the production of profit-earning imperfectly competitive
industries.2 Export subsidies can be used tocarry out such"profit-shifting"
policies. Such a motive for subsidization requires the presence of (at least)2.
two exporting countries. We also assume a third country which imports the
iiperfect1y competitive good.
Our results also depend (of course) on the equilibrium concept we use.
The industry in question is modelled as a simple Cournot (or Nash quantity)
duopoly: firms take as given subsidy levels set by governments and output
levels set by their rivals. Governments are able to act first, and set
subsidy levels before output levels, using their understanding of how
subsidies influence the output equilibrium. We first consider a single
government, then examine a Nash equilibrium in government subsidy levels.
As expressed by the referee "firms play Nash against all other players, and
governments play Stackelberg against firms and Nash against other governments."
A slightly different expression of the same structure is that the equilibrium
is subgame perfect3 in a two stage model in which governments (simultaneously)
choose subsidy levels in the first stage and firms (simultaneously)
choose output levels in the second stage.4
In relating our analysis to the literature of international trade theory
there are several themes that should be mentioned. Recent papers by Spencer
and Brander5 (1983) and Krugman (1984) explicitly use the idea that national
governments may wish tb help domestic firms expand market shares in pro-
fitable areas. This is tangentially related to Basevi (1970) ,Frenkel
(1971), and Pursell and Snape (1973) where a domestic monopolist can
benefit by exporting, and to Brander and Spencer (1981), where a govern-
ment may promote entry of a domestic firm which can earn rent, from foreign
sales. One can also connect our arguments to the "distortions" literature
associated with, among others, Bhagwati (1971). Specifically, the possi-
bility of a second best policy, like subsidies, being in the national
interest depends on the existence of some distortion, which in our case
is imperfect competition. The focus here, however, is really quite3.
different, as it is the effect of government policies on the strategic
interaction between domestic and foreign firms which is of the essence.
Section 2 sets out the basic model and shows the unilateral incentive
of a government to subsidize exports. In section 3 the argument is
presented in a simple general equilibrium framework, incorporating domestic
consumption of the imperfectly competitive good. The effects of the
subsidy are interpreted using terms of trade and output effects, and the
relationship between our results nd the standard optimum tariff argument is
discussed. Section 4 Extends tjie analysis to the case in which governments
in both exporting countries may subsidize exports, leading to a Nash equili-
brium in subsidies. Section 5 extends the analysis further to include
the optimal response of the government in the importing nation,arid section
6 contains concluding remarks.
2. The Model
We use the simplest possible structure capable of bringing out the
main points.As mentioned, firm behaviour is modelled as a simple Nash
quantity (or Cournot) duopoly, with one domestic firm and one foreign firm,
who produce identical products.6 We assume (for this section) that both
firms produce only for third markets: there is no consumption in the
producing countries. An important assumption is that the government under-
stands the structure of the industry and is able to set a credible subsidy
on exports in advance of the quantity decision by firms.
The domestic firm produces quantity x and the foreign firm produces
y. The domesic firm maximizes variable profit it.
it(x,y;s)xp(x+y)—c(x)+sx (1)
where c is variable cost, s is a per unit subsidy, and p(x+y) is the (inverse)
world demand (or price) for the good. There may be some additional sunk cost
which explains the existence of imperfect competition in this industry. It
is omitted since it plays no role in our analysis. The first order condi—4.
tion for profit maximization is then
(2)




where derivatives are denoted by subscripts except for p', the derivative
of inverse demand.
Similarly, the variable profit of the foreign firm, ,isgiven by
yp(x+y) -c*(y) (1*)
leading to first and second order conditions
(2*)
=2p'+yp <0 (3*)





xx xy yy yx (5)
Condition (4) means that own marginal revenue declines with an increase in
the output of the other firm.Thisis equivalent, given satisfaction of
the second order conditions, to reaction functions being downward sloping.
This is a fairly standard regularity condition in noncooperative models,
but it can be violated by feasible demand structures, in particular, if
demand is very convex. From second order conditions (3) and(3* and
from (4), condition (5) always holds if marginal cost is nondecreasing.
Only if marginal cost falls more steeply than demand can it be violated.
Condition (5) means that own effects of output on marginal profit dominate
cross effects.




If conditions (3), (3*) and (6) hold globally, they imply global unique-
ness of the equilibrium (see Nikaido (1968), Ch. 7). Condition (6) is
also the Routh-Hurwitz condition for reaction function stability.
Rather obviously, comparative static properties of the model will
depend on these conditions. If one wishes to consider cases in which
the conditions are vinlated, "perverse" comparative static properties and
policy implications can be obtained. This is of some interest, but
we focus on structures. which satisfy (4) and (5), sincethey include most
economically relevant cases.
First order conditions (2) and (2*) are reaction functions for the
two firms in implicit form. Each shows the best response of the firm to
any particular output chosen by its rival. The simultaneous solution to
(2) and (2*) is the noncooperative solution.
What is the effect of the subsidy, 5?Itis fairly easy to calculate
the comparative static effects dx/ds and dy/ds. Total differentiation of
first order conditions (2) and (2*) yields
irdx+irdy+tr dsO (7) xx xy xs
* * * rdx+itdy+itds=0 (7*) yx yy ys
Sinceir, =1and =0,these equations can be put in matrix form and
solved, using Cramer's rule, to yield
dx/ds_iTyy/D >0 (8)
dy/ds = ID<0 (8*)6.
where D is defined in expression (6).
Naturally enough, an increase in the export subsidy, s, increases domestic
exports, as expressed in (8) (using (3) and (6)). Similarly, from (4)
and (6), a domestic subsidy reduces the output of the foreign firm as
shown in (8*).
Diagrammatically, the subsidy shifts out the reaction function of
the domestic firm, increasing its exports and reducing foreign exports,
as shown in Figure 1, where the subsidy shifts the equilibrium from N to S.
-InsertFigure 1 —
Thesubsidy lowers marginal cost to the domestic firm, which commits
it to a higher reaction function. Propostion 1 summarizes the (compara-
tive static) effects of the subsidy on prices and profits.
Proposition 1
An increase in the domestic subsidy
i) lowers the world price of the good
ii) increases domestic profit
iii) reduces foreign profit
Proof:
i) The change in price is given by the slope of inverse demand times




- ;)/Dby (8) and (8*)
<0by (3*), (5) and (6).
ii) from total differentiation of iTwithrespect to s,
dn/dS + + 3iT/S
Since =0by (2), 1T/S= xby (1),















Adomestic subsidy, not surprisingly, lowers price, increases domestic
profit and lowers foreign profit. What is perhaps more surprising is that
the subsidy actually increases domestic welfare net of the subsidy. In our
simple case with all production for export, domestic surplus1 G, net of
the subsidy, is the profit of the domestic firm (earned from exports) minus
the cost of the subsidy.
G(s) =ir(x,y;s)—sx (11)





At s =0, is clearly positive (by 8*) indicating that a marginal increase
in the subsidy will increase welfare. Alternatively, setting G50 to obtain
the optimal subsidy yields
s =xp'y5/x5
>0 (13)
leading to the following proposition.
Proposition 2
The domestic country has a unilateral incentive to offer an export
subsidy to the domestic firm.
***
Thisis a simple and familiar model with a striking result: export
subsidies which enable the domestic firm to capture a larger share of8.
profitable international markets can appear to be attractive policies
from a domestic perspective. This occurs despite the fact that the
contribution of the subsidy to profit exactly offsets the cost of the
subsidy to the government, leading to a domestic benefit function which
is the same as the profit function of the domestic firm with no subsidy. In
essence, the government's prior action in setting a subsidy changes the
domestic firm's set of credible actions (i.e., its reaction function) in
the output rivalry with its rival. The noncooperative equilibrium in
the inter-firm rivalryis altered in favour of the domestic firm.
The formal structure is similar to Dixit (1980), where a firm may
influence later output rivalry by an earlier irreversible capital stock
decision, or to Prescott and Visscher (1976), where an irreversible location
decision determines later output reaction functions. Instead of a prior
capital or location decision, however, we have a prior government subsidy.
In acting first, the government can actually move the domestic firm to
the Stackelberg leader position in output space.
position 3
The optimal export subsidy, s, moves the industry equilibrium to
what would, in the absence of a subsidy, be the Stackelberg leader-
follower position in output space with the domestic firm as leader.
Pr f
Suppose the domestic firm were a Stackelberg leader without a
subsidy. From differentiation of (1), the first order condition for a
profit maximum is then,
+TT (x,y;O)(dy/dx)0 (14)9.
where dy/dx is the slope of foreign firm's reaction function. Total
differentiation of (2*) (as shown in (7*)) implies that dy/dx =






If we then compare condition (15) with first order condition (2) (sub-
stituting in the optimal subsidy given by (13) for s) we find that the
conditions are identical, which proves the result.
***
Thatthis case for subsidies is dependent on the existence of at
least one foreign competitor producing for the world market should now
be clear. To take the simplest case, if the domestic firm had an
international monopoly in the imperfectly competitive good, then by the
envelope theorem x and from (12), G5—sx which is always negative If
s is positive.
3. Terms of Trade Effects
How is it that a country can perceive an incentive to subsidize an
exported good when such an action will lead to a worsening of the
country's terms of trade. This would never be optimal in a two-good
perfectly competitive neoclassical world. If the country were large
enough to influence the price of the exported good, then an export tax
would be appropriate so as to improve the terms of trade.
However,expanded output sold at a price above marginal cost can lead
to a net increase in profit, more than offsetting the adverse terms of
trade offset.
In this section we see how the terms of trade effect is incorporated
by examining the argument for export subsidies in a simple general
equilibrium framework familiar to trade theorists. This allows illustra—10.
tion of the argument using a production possibility curve diagram.
We also extend the analysis to consider the possibility of domestic
Consumption.
The inclusion of domestic consumption is particularly simple if firms
can price discriminate between the home and foreign (third country) market
and if each enjoys a monopoly in its home market. If marginal cost is
constant an export subsidy then does not affect the profit maximizing level
of sales in the domestic market. The existence of domestic consumption
therefore does not affect the noncooperative export subsidy levels.
However if marginal cost were decreasing, the export subsidy would reduce
the cost of production for the domestic market as well as for the export
market so that the optimal export subsidy would be higher in the presence
of domestic consumption. Conversely the optimal noncooperative
export subsidy would be lower if marginal cost were increasing.
On the other hand, if a subsidy must be applied to all production,
whether it is exported or sold domestically, then the pressure of domestic
consumption tends to increase the optimal subsidy. This is because with
imperfect competition, the level of domestic sales is below the pareto.
efficient level. We model this case in this section under the additional
assumption that markets are unified so that the price of x is the same
in the home and in the export market. Also, although the distribution
of each firm's sales between markets is indeterminate with the zero
transport costs that we are implicitly assuming, it is convenient to
assume that each producing country supplies its own consumers (as well as
exporting to the third country).
Consider a utility function u(z,m)7, where z is domestic consumption
of the imperfectly competitive good and m is consumption of a numeraire
conpetitive good. The change in utility associated with marginal changes11.
in consumption levels is given by
duu2dz +udm 1l6
Dividing through by Urnyields
dldU/Um =pdz+dm (17)
where p =Uz/Um
is the relative price of the imperfectly competitive
export good. dl is the change in "real income" and must have the same
sign as the change in utility.
Domestic production levels are x and Assumingall profits from
sales of x accrue to domestic residents, balanced trade requires that the
value of production equal the value of consumption.
px +m=pz+m (18)
Totally differentiating (18) and substituting into (17) yields
dl =(x—z)dp+pdx+dm (19)
This is the standard breakdown of a change in real income into a "terms
of trade" effect, (x-.z) dp, and a "value of output" effect, pdx +dm.
(A frequent reference for this kind of analysis is Caves and Jones (1981)).
The marginal rate of transformation is ..dm/dx =c where marginal cost,
c, is measured in units of m, Therefore (19) becomes
dl =(x-z)dp+(p_c)dx (20)
Under pure competition p =c
so a subsidy, which causes dp to be negative,
produces a negative change in real income.
Starting from the equilib'iurri determined by Cournot rivalry between
domestic and foreign firms, however, a subsidy increases real income. Substi-
tuting p —c,
=-xp'—s(from (2)) into (20), we obtain
dl =(x-z)dp-(xp'+s)dx (?1)
With a general utility function, the comparative static effects
derived in Section 2 do not apply directly, because of income effects.
In general, a change in the subsidy affects profit and income in the12.
producing countries and therefore may affect demand arising from producing
countries. (These effects tend to be small because the loss to one
country is partially offset by the gain to the other as subsidy levels
change). At any rate, the main point can be made by using the utility
function, u(z,m)tj(z) +m,since, in this case, all income effects are
absorbed by the perfectly competitive numeraire good. With this utility
function previous comparative static results apply exactly so dividing







It is clear that duds is positive at s =0since p5 and y5 are negative,
indicating that there is an incentive to raise the subsidy to positive




The gieral equilibrium effect of the subsidy is illustrated8 in Figure 2.
-InsertFigure 2 —
PointC represents the competitive production paint with the associated
consumption at QC and utility level c. A subsidy from this point must
lower welfare since production moves down the production possibility frontier
(PPF) and the terms of trade move adversely.
The quantity of good x produced by the domestic firm at the noncoop-
erative Cournot equilibrium is indicated by point N. Consumption occurs
at Qfl, indicating that quantity NA of good x is traded for QA of good m.
The absolute value of the slope of QN, which represents the terms of trade,
then exceeds the absolute value of the slope of the PPF, which represents
the marginal rate of transformation. (As drawn, utility at the noncooper-
ative equilibrium, u, exceeds uC but this need not be the case9 and is





The imposition of a subsidy then shifts production to point S,
increasing the output of good x but worsening the terms of trade as
represented by the absolute value of the slope of QSS. Nevertheless (as
we have shown) a small subsidy at the noncooperative equilibrium always
increases domestic welfare through an expansion of profitable exports.
As illustrated in Figure 2, domestic consumption occurs at and
consumers enjoy higher level of utility uS rather than uVl.
4. Two Governments: Nash Export Subsidy Equilibrium
The actions of the two foreign governments must also be considered.
Surely the two producing nations face similar incentives and there also
may be some response by the importing nation. In this section we examine
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium in subsidies in which each exporting
country is assumed to choose its subsidy level given the subsidy level
of the other exporting country. The actions of the importing nation
are considered in the next section. As in section 3, we assume that
any consumption of the good by the producing nations is at a common
world price and that the subsidy applies to all units of production. If
these consumption levels are zero, the subsidi's reduce to pure export
subsidies of the type considered in section 2.
Assume the utility of the consumers inthe foreign exporting country
** ** *
canbe represented by u(z ,m )= IJ(z)+ mwhere z is consumption of
*
theimperfectly competitive good and m is consumption of a numeralre
competitive good. With this utility function the marginal utility of
income is constant and equal to 1, so that consumer benefit from the
consumption of z is consistently measured by IJ*(z*)_pz*. The "gain"
function of the foreign producing nation from a per unit production14.
subsidy, s*, given s is then
G*(s,s*)U*(z*)_pz* +*(xy;s*).s*y (24)
where lr*= yp(x+y)_c(y)+s*y and z, x and y all depend on s and s.
Using dU*/dz*p and d7r*/dS*yp'x5+y (see(9)), the first order
condition for a maximum of G* with respect to s is
G —ZI5. +yri'x—sy5
=0 (25)
Similarly the gain of the domestic country at subsidy levels s and s is
G(s,s*) tJ(z)—pz +ir(x,y;s)-sx (26)





This expression is the same as (22) in section 3, reflecting the fact that
the foreign subsidy s affects G only indirectly through the values of
z, x and y. Expressions (25) and (27) define the noncooperative Nash
equilibrium in subsidies and imply the following proposition.
Proposition 4
The noncooperative Nash subsidy equilibrium is characterized by positive
production subsidies in both exporting countries
Proof
Rearranging (25) and (27) yields
s =xp'y5/x5
—zp/xand s =yp'X?/Yr_z*p/y5 (28)
Introducing s does not affect the signs of the comparative static effects
<0,x >0and PS <0given by (8)., (8*) and Proposition 1 (although
the magnitudes are altered) so that s is still positive. Comparative static
effects X.r1 and are simetric implying that s* is also positive...
** *
Ifthe exporting countries do not consume the good, then zz*015.
and it is clear from (28) that both the pure export subsidies are
still positive: the incentive for subsidization remains. Regard-
less of the level of consumption by the exporting nations, however, their joint
welfare would be higher if subsidy levels were reduced below the Nash
equilibrium levels.The noncooperative solution is jointly suboptimal
for the producing countries but if one country sets a zero subsidy, it
cannot expect this to deter the other country and it will then be worse
off than if it had joined the subsidy game.
Proposition 5
At the noncooperative Nash subsidy equilibrium given by (25) and (27),
joint welfare of the producing nations would rise if subsidy levels were
reduced.
Proof
The joint gain function is g =G(s,s*)+G*(s,s*).Since
at the noncooperative equilibrium, by (27) G50, and using (24)






Substituting (28) for s, using p =p'(x5
+y5)and gathering terms yields
=
(y_z*)p'x5(1xyIyx) (30)
From (8) and (8*) and similar expressions for x5, and y5*,
= (31)
which with some exports (y_z*>0), is negative by (6) and (8). The effect
of s is symetric. Therefore a reduction in s or s will increase joint
wel fare.
***16.
The subsidy levels which maximize joint welfare are1°
s =(y_(z+z*))pJ
; 5* = (x(z+z*))p* (32)
These jointly optimal subsidy levels are positive provided total consumption
by producing nations exceeds their individual export levels. If there were
no consumption of the good by producing nations, the jointly optimal policy
would be to tax exports. These optimal taxes would ensure that each firm
would produce the same output that a member of a two-firm monopoly cartel
would, enabling the two producing countries to act as a monopoly against
the rest of the world. The countries are, we assume, unable to make bind-
ing agreements of this sort.
5.Three Governments: Nash tariff and subsidy equilibrium
The consuming nation also has an incentive to set a tariff or subsidy
on the import of the imperfectly competive good, so as to extract some of
the rent earned by its producers. The optimal tariff (or subsidy) for the
importing nation has been analysed by Brander and Spencer (1984a) for the
case of a foreign Cournot oligopoly, but no consideration was given to
the way export subsidies might affect the optimal import tariff or to the nature
of the Nash tariff and subsidy equilibrium between the three governments.
For this purpose we again assume a simple additive utility function in
good x and the numeraire good. Then let G3(s,s*,t) represent the gain to
the importing nation (country 3) from a tariff, t, on total imports
X =x+y of the imperfectly competitive good. Then,
G3(s,s*,t) 11(X) —q(X)X+tX (33)
where q(X) is the consumer price including the tariff. The first order
condition for the choice of t given s and s is
G_Xq'(X)X+tX+X=O (34)
where X. x. +17.
The comparative static effectsx and (obtainedby the same




From condition (6), D is positive and at least one of
{x*Yt) is negative. In the syninetric case in which the twofirms face
the same costs bothx and are negative ensuring that <0.From (34)
t =-Xl_q'(x)X)/x+ (36)
From (36), with <0,the optimal tariff is positive If the rate
of change of the consumer price with respect to the tariff is less than one.
This is the "usual" case.1
With a tariff on imports, the price function p(X) becomes p(X;t)
and must be re-interpreted as the producer price received by firms net
of the tariff: p(X;t) q(x)t. With this interpretation, there is no
change in formulas (25) and (27) which,together with (34), are the first
order conditions for the (three) government subsidy and tariff equilibrium.
To see more clearly the nature of this Nash tariff and subsidy
equilibrium, consider the case of linear demand and constant marginal cost.
Assume also that exporting nations do not consume the imperfectly competi-
tive good. In this case = = 2p'and == p',
so that from (8), (8*) and (35)
x =y
=l/3p',x=y5= —2/3p' and x= y5 =l/3p' (37)
Hence using the fact that q'=p/xEp', from (28) and (36)
(with z=z*=0).
s =-xp'/2;s =-yp'/2and t =-Xp'/2 (38)
In this example, the tariff set by the importing country is just the sum
of the two subsidy levels set by the exporting countries. Also, taking the




increase l.n the subsidy set by one exporting nation serves to increase
the import tariff by 1/8 as much (using (37)) enabling the importing
country to shift additional rent to itself. (An equal Increase In both
s and s leads to an increase In t by 1/4 of this increase). In this
example12 the Introduction of export subsidies increases both the import
tariff and the level of world output so that the Importing country increases Its
tariff revenue by 30% relative to the situations where t is set optimally but
both s and s are zero.
Conversely, If both s and ,s are chosenoptimafly,• at
increaseIn the import tariff serves to reduce export subsidy levels by 1/5.
The tariff reduces the potential gains from (unilateral) export subsi-
dization and in this linear example, rather than offsetting the cost
increase from the tariff, the exporting countries reduce subsidy levels.
One further possible direction of generalization suggests itself:
if markets in the two producing countries are segmented rather than unified,
then there may be two-way trade in the imperfectly competitive commodity.
Dixit(1984) analyzes the motives for and consequences of tax/subsidy, tariff,
an.d anti-trust policies in the presence of such trade between producing
countries, but without third markets.
6. Concluding Remarks
There are a couple of caveats that should be stressed. First, any
policy involving subsidies should be viewed with suspicion because the
marginal opportunity cost of government revenue may be much higher than
the value of unity assumed in simple surplus analysis, Secondly, in a
world of imperfect information and imperfect governments, any argument
indicating a plausible national motive for subsidies may open the door19.
for various kinds of socially wasteful rent-seeking. These are Important
concerns, but it seems worthwhile to us to separate out the logical impli-
cation of imperfect competition per se for international trade policy incentives.
What the paper shows is that noncooperative behaviour provides incentives
for such policies, but these policies are jointly suboptimal from the point
of view of producing nations taken together.
The paper is built around what seems to us an important part of the
modern international environment: •countries perceive themselves as
being in competition with each other for profitable international markets.
In such a world the credibility of governments can confer strategic advantages
on domestic firms. In particular export subsidies can appear as attractive
weapons because they improve the relative position of the domestic firm in
noncooperative rivalries with other firms, and allow it to expand its
market share. The terms of trade will move against the subsidizing country
but price still exceeds the marginal resource cost of exports so that the
resulting expansion of exports can actually raise domestic welfare.
Producing countries have cooperative incentives to get together to agree
not to use such subsidies, but they also have an incentive to cheat on any
resulting agreements, suggesting that international regulations which attempt
to discourage subsidization, such as GATT regualtions, are likely to require
regular reinforcement if they are to survive.20.
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stages and we also thank an anonymous referee for inducing us to Improve our
exposition and for offering several suggestions leading to improvements in
the substance of the paper,
1. One important extension of the standard optimum tariff argument, considered by
Graaff (1949-50) and developed by Feenstra (1983) Is that In an n
good world (n >3)the optimal tariff structure may Involve export
subsidies on some goods because of what Feenstra calls "export linkages."
2. We model the rents as accruing to residual profit takers In the firm.
One could easily imagine more complex and more realistic structures in
which benefits also accrue to workers in the form of wages above
opportunity cost, or in expanded employment at a (high) fixed wage.
3. The subgame perfection concept is well exposited in Shubik (1982).
The basic idea is that each player anticipates that other players will
act in their own best interests when they choose the levels of their
strategy variables: these are the only "credible" choices.
4 Why the governments are able to act first is something wedo not model
explicitly. In essence the government subsidy announcements are simply
assumed to be credible. This government credibility may arise because
a government has some reputation which it has an incentive to maintain.
5. Spencer and Brander (1983) is a companion paper to this which shares
the idea the governments may wish to help domestic firms capture large
shares of profit-earning industries. In that paper governments subsidize
R&D activities while firms themselves use R&D for strategic purposes.
This gives rise to a fairly complicated structure in which the simple
general equilibrium aspects are surpressed.19.
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One could easily imagine more complex and more realistic structures in
which benefits also accrue to workers In the form of wages above
opportunity cost, or in expanded employment at a (high) fixed wage.
3. The subgame perfection concept is well exposited in Shubik (1982).
The basic idea is that each player anticipates that other players will
act in their own best interests when they choose the levels of their
strategy variables: these are the only "credible" choices.
4 Why the governments are able to act first is something wedo not model
explicitly. In essence the government subsidy announcements are simply
assumed to be credible. This government credibility may arise because
a government has some reputation which it has an incentive to maintain.
5. Spencer and Brander (1983) is a companion paper to this which shares
the idea the governments may wish to help domestic firms capture large
shares of profit-earning industries. In that paper governments subsidize
R&D activities while firms themselves use R&D for strategic purposes.
This gives rise to a fairly complicated structure In which the simple
general equilibrium aspects are surpressed.21.
6.These assumptions could be relaxed to some extent without affecting
the central principles under consideration. However, adding more
domestic firms weakens the incentive for domestic subsidies (see
Dixit(1984) and Salant (1984)), and the introduction of more imperfectly
competitive industries may weaken the subsidy case for any one industry
(see Dixit and Grossman (1984)). In addition, changing the nature of
the oligopolistic rivalry between firms may also affect the results,
as shown in Eaton and Grossman (1983).
7. We are assuming an economy with Identical consumers who receive the
same income based on identical endowments and an equal share of the
profits of the imperfectly competitive domestic firm, This Is the
usual assumption one makes so as to abstract from the problem that the
national distribution of income affects demand and welfare.
8. Similar diagrams are available in the literature to illustrate other
imperfectly competitive situations. For example Rieber (1982) illus-
tratesthe case of a domestic monopoly producing an export good with
a competitive fringe inthe foreign country.
9.Whether this is the case depends on thetradeoff between the consumer
lossfrom the restriCtion of domestic consumption of x versus the
additionalprofits earnedfrom exports.
10.At the jointly optimal solution ag/s=0 and ag/as*0. The solutions for






There isa corresponding expression for g/as*. Then using (8) and (8*)22




These can be solved by Inspection for S= (y.(z+z*))p1and s*(x_(z+z*))p.
11. The rate of change of the consumer price with respect to the tariff is less than
one if the demand curve Is not too convex to the origin. Constant
elasticity demand curves violate this condition, but linear demand curves
and most other plausible demand curves satisfy it. (See Brander and
Spencer (l984a).)
12. Assuming linear demand and cc*, if s=s*=O, but t—Xp'/2 is set optimally
x=y= .-(a..c)/4p'. Tariff revenue is tX =-(a—c)2/8p.With the intro-
duction of subsidies, s =s=—xp'2,output rises to x=y= —2 (a—c)2/7p'
and tariff revenue to tX =—8(a—c)2/49p',which is a 30% increase.
13, From (38), ds/dt =(-p'/2)(x5ds/dt
+xs*ds*jdt
+xe).Using
ds/dt =ds*/dt,we obtain ds/dt =_p'xt/t2
+p(x5
+x5)j,which,
from (37), reduces to —1/5,References 23.
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